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Abstract
Background
Despite widespread implementation across Africa, there is limited evidence of the effect of
payment for performance (P4P) schemes in low income countries on the coverage of quality
services and affordability, consistent with universal health coverage objectives. We exam-
ined the effect of a government P4P scheme on utilisation, quality, and user costs of health
services in Tanzania.
Methods
We evaluated the effects of a P4P scheme on utilisation of all maternal and child immuniza-
tion services targeted by the scheme, and non-targeted general outpatient service use. We
also evaluated effects on patient satisfaction with care and clinical content of antenatal
care, and user costs. The evaluation was done in 150 facilities across all 7 intervention dis-
tricts and 4 comparison districts with two rounds of data collection over 13-months in Janu-
ary 2012 and February 2013. We sampled 3000 households of women who had delivered
in the 12 months prior to interview; 1500 patients attending health facilities for targeted and
non-targeted services at each round of data collection. Difference-in-difference regression
analysis was employed.
Findings
We estimated a significant positive effect on two out of eight targeted indicators. There was
an 8.2% (95% CI: 3.6% to 12.8%) increase in coverage of institutional deliveries among
women in the intervention area, and a 10.3% (95% CI: 4.4% to 16.1%) increase in the provi-
sion of anti-malarials during pregnancy. Use of non-targeted services reduced at dispensa-
ries by 57.5 visits per month among children under five (95% CI: -110.2 to -4.9) and by 90.8
visits per month for those aged over five (95% CI: -156.5 to -25.2). There was no evidence
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of an effect of P4P on patient experience of care for targeted services. There was a 0.05
(95% CI: 0.01 to 0.10) increase in the patient satisfaction score for non-targeted services.
P4P was associated with a 5.0% reduction in those paying out of pocket for deliveries (95%
CI: -9.3% to -0.7%) but there was no evidence of an effect on the average amount paid.
Conclusion
This study adds to the very limited evidence on the effects of P4P at scale and highlights the
potential risks of such schemes in relation to non-targeted service use. Further consider-
ation of the design of P4P schemes is required to enhance progress towards universal
health coverage, and close monitoring of effects on non-targeted services and user costs
should be encouraged.
Introduction
Payment for performance (P4P) is widely regarded as a promising strategy to increase coverage
and quality of maternal and child health services in low income settings and make progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 [1]. In 2013, 31 low and middle income
countries globally were implementing P4P schemes targeting maternal and child health ser-
vices[2].
P4P typically involves the allocation of funds to health facilities and to health workers based
on the achievement of performance targets related to service utilisation and quality of care [3].
It is expected that health workers will respond to financial incentives by being more motivated
to deliver quality care and attract patients to the facility [4–6]. The additional funding provided
by P4P is also expected to improve resource availability at health facilities, enhancing the qual-
ity of services. Further, health care providers may conceivably reduce the user cost of services
in a bid to achieve targets. It is also possible that by focusing on targeted services, health work-
ers are diverted from non-targeted services resulting in their reduced quality and coverage [7].
Despite the widespread implementation of P4P across the African continent, the evidence
base on P4P effects in low income settings is very limited [8–11]. There has to date been very
few rigorous evaluation studies in Africa [12–14]. A study in Rwanda reported effects on a
range of utilisation and quality of care outcomes targeted by the P4P scheme [12]. Services not
targeted by the scheme were not examined. Studies in Burundi, examined the effect on a sub
set of targeted outcomes, but also included components of care that were not directly incentiv-
ized [13–14].
Universal health coverage (UHC)–or access to care of sufficient quality, without incurring
financial hardship—is now seen as an overarching goal post-2015 [15], and monitoring prog-
ress at country level is being encouraged [16]. Equity is also seen to be a critical component of
UHC [17]. In order to make progress towards UHC, it is important to consider the effect of
interventions such as P4P on UHC goals. By improving service coverage and quality and
reducing user costs, P4P could potentially enhance progress towards universal health coverage
[18, 19]. However, this needs to be balanced against the risk of reduced coverage and quality of
non-targeted services which could compromise UHC.
To date, there has been limited assessment in low income settings of P4P effects on non-tar-
geted services [20], user costs [21], or quality in terms of patient satisfaction and/or content of
care [10, 13, 14, 22] and equity [13, 14, 23]. In order to assess whether P4P is compatible with
universal coverage objectives we assessed the effect of a P4P scheme implemented by the
Evaluation of Payment for Performance in Tanzania
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013 August 28, 2015 2 / 16
undertake this research. The Government of Norway
also funded the P4P programme in Pwani region of
Tanzania. The funder of the study had no role in data
analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the
manuscript. All authors have completed the ICMJE
uniform disclosure form at www.icmje.org/coi_
disclosure.pdf (available on request from the
corresponding author). This does not alter the
authors' adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing
data and materials.
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare at scale in one region of Tanzania on quality and utilisa-
tion of targeted and non-targeted services, user costs and equity by means of a prospective con-
trolled before and after study.
Materials and Methods
The P4P programme in Tanzania
A payment for performance scheme was introduced in 2011 by the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare in Pwani region of Tanzania with an estimated population of just over 1 million,
to inform a national P4P programme[24]. The scheme is ongoing, providing financial pay-
ments to health facilities and district and regional health managers as a bonus based on
achievement of targets relating to maternal and child health care (Table 1). These payments are
additional to the funding facilities receive to cover operational costs and the salaries of health
workers. The targets are either for specific services (e.g. institutional delivery; postnatal care
within 7 days of delivery) or for care provided during a service (e.g. two doses of Intermittent
presumptive treatment (IPT) for malaria during antenatal care (ANC)). Performance targets
are assessed and payment made every six months. Targets relating to partogram completion,
maternal and neonatal death audits and timely submission of Health Management Information
System (HMIS) reports were also introduced. Performance is measured through the HMIS
which was updated to include the P4P targets. Facilities capture HMIS data on paper as before
(using patient registers and monthly tally sheets) but districts started using a computerised sys-
tem to enter, aggregate and analyse these data.
The programme design stipulates that at least 75% of bonus payments are distributed
among health workers with the remainder being retained by the facility for investment in
drugs, supplies or minor renovation. Payments are made if at least 75% of the target is
achieved. Full payment is made if 100% of the target is achieved; otherwise 50% of the potential
payout is made. The maximum payout per cycle is USD 820 for dispensaries; USD 3,220 for
Table 1. Service indicators and performance targets for facilities.
Coverage indicators Method Baseline coverage (previous cycle)
0–
20%
21–
40%
41–
70%
71–85% 85%+*
Institutional delivery rate Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 days of
delivery.
Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage point
increase
20% 15% 10% Maintain above
71%
Maintain
% children under 1 year received measles vaccine Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+* Maintain
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain
Content of care indicators
% ANC clients on IPT2 Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain above
80%
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%+ Maintain
Polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%+ Maintain
*80+: 80% or more.
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. 2011. The Coast Region Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design
Document.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.t001
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health centres; and USD 6,790 for hospitals. The health worker component equates to about
10% of their monthly salary.
Facility performance data are verified each cycle by national, regional and district stakehold-
ers by comparing aggregate data to facility registers. District and regional managers receive
bonus payments of up to USD 3,000 per cycle based on the performance of facilities in their
district or region.
To participate in the scheme facilities must open bank accounts. The National Health Insur-
ance Fund is the fund holder and disburses funds to these accounts based on performance in
each cycle.
Evaluation design
The evaluation study received ethical approval from the Ifakara Health Institute institutional
review board and the ethics committee of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine.
The study protocol has been previously reported[25].
A controlled before and after study design was employed. Surveys were conducted in Janu-
ary 2012 and 13 months later. The intervention was implemented across an entire region.
However, core implementation occurs at the health facility level and eligibility to participate in
the scheme is also determined at this level. Therefore, the health facility was the primary sam-
pling unit. Intervention facilities were sampled from all seven intervention districts. Facilities
were sampled from those that were eligible to participate in the payment for performance
scheme (they offered reproductive and child health services and had submitted HMIS data for
the previous year, enabling performance targets to be set). All eligible hospitals (n = 6) and
health centres (n = 16) from the intervention districts were included in the sample along with
all eligible faith-based and parastatal dispensaries (n = 11). Public dispensaries were sampled at
random with probability proportional to the number of public dispensaries in a given district
(n = 42). The same number of facilities were sampled from four neighbouring comparison dis-
tricts (Kilwa, Mvomero, Morogoro town and Morogoro rural) which were similar to interven-
tion districts in relation to poverty and literacy rates, the rate of institutional deliveries, infant
mortality, population per health facility and the number of children under one year of age per
capita. Comparison facilities were selected based on their similarity to intervention facilities in
relation to annual outpatient care visits and staffing levels. A total of 150 facilities were sam-
pled, 75 facilities in intervention and comparison sites respectively (Fig 1). In Pwani region,
46% of all eligible facilities were included in the sample and 34% of all facilities in the compari-
son districts.
Primary data were collected from three sources. We conducted a survey of households of
women who delivered in the previous 12 months from the catchment area around the sampled
facilities to determine population coverage of targeted maternal and child health services, satis-
faction with delivery care, provider kindness during delivery and user costs for three of the tar-
geted services all of which should be free at government facilities, although user fee exemptions
are not well enforced [26]. Data on socio-economic characteristics were also compiled. A total
of 3,000 households were sampled at each round, sufficient to detect an 11 percentage point
increase in institutional deliveries (from 50 to 61%), with an assumed coefficient of variation
(standard deviation/mean) of the true rates between clusters within each group, ‘k’ value of
025, 90% power, and a 5% significance level, assuming a 90% response rate [27].
We conducted exit interviews with patients attending antenatal or postnatal care, or women
with children under-one year of age coming for a preventive check up or an immunisation to
assess adherence to national clinical guidelines for ANC, waiting and consultation time and
patient satisfaction with inter-personal care for targeted and non-targeted services. A total of
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1,500 patients were sampled at each round, sufficient to detect a 17% reduction in waiting time
from 114 minutes (SD 66) to 95 minutes, with a k value of 025, 80% power and a 5% signifi-
cance level (Fig 1).
Finally, a survey was conducted at each facility to gather monthly service utilisation data for
targeted and non-targeted services directly from patient registers for the period January 2010
to December 2012.
Baseline surveys were conducted in January 2012, after health workers had received training
on P4P which took place during the second half of 2011. The risk here is that the programme
Fig 1. Study Profile.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.g001
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may have affected outcomes at baseline, limiting observable effects. We addressed this issue
within the household survey by sampling women who had delivered in the 12 months before
the training of health workers started (October 2011) and considered trends since the start of
2010 in the analysis of patient register data from facilities. It was not possible to make such
adjustments to the exit interview data. However, baseline outcomes from the exit survey were
similar between intervention and comparison sites. A few years prior to the start of the P4P
scheme, the government launched a national P4P programme, but this was never fully imple-
mented. Health workers were therefore unlikely to have been convinced by the scheme and
changed their behavior in response to it until the first payment was made, an assumption sup-
ported by formative research prior to the baseline.
Outcome measures
As a complex health systems intervention, we sought to capture the effects of P4P on a broad
set of pre-specified indicators, relating to service coverage, quality and user cost, and their dis-
tribution across socio-economic groups (S1 Table). Service use was measured for all targeted
services shown in Table 1 and non-targeted services (outpatient department (OPD) services) as
well as for a set of services closely related to targeted services (at least one ANC consultation,
four or more ANC visits, postnatal care (PNC) within 2 months of delivery) to check for ‘spill-
over’ effects [25]. Service quality was measured in relation to content of care for ANC through
a 21 item index based on clinical guidelines. We generated an index based on the arithmetic
mean score across all item. Patients’ experience of quality was measured for targeted and non-
targeted services by waiting time (in minutes), kindness during delivery (using a 10 point scale)
and patient satisfaction with provider-client interactions (using an index of 13–19 items
adapted from the World Bank, Impact Evaluation Toolkit) [28]. Adherence to exemption pol-
icy (free care) was measured as the share of patients paying out of pocket or giving gifts to ser-
vice providers. We also measured the average amount paid for ANC, delivery care and PNC.
Distributional effects were assessed by comparing outcomes across wealth terciles, for any sta-
tistically significant utilisation, quality or cost outcome. We generated a wealth index based on
ownership of assets and housing particulars using principal components analysis, following the
methods outlined in [29, 30]. We ranked individuals according to their index score and gener-
ated wealth terciles, three equally sized groups. We measured the effect of P4P among the poor-
est relative to the least poor tercile, and among the middle tercile relative to the least poor
tercile.
Statistical analysis
We identify the effects of P4P by comparing changes in outcomes in facilities with P4P to
changes in outcomes in facilities without P4P. A difference-in-difference regression analysis
was used to assess the effect of P4P on outcomes with facility fixed-effects, as shown in Eq 1.
Yijt ¼ b0 þ b1ðP4Pj  dtÞ þ b2dt þ b3Xijt þ gj þ εijt 1
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the facility level, or
the facility catchment area, as this is the level at which sampling was done and the intervention is
directed at facilities. We conﬁrmed the robustness of our results to using non-linear (logit) mod-
els for binary outcomes, and clustering standard errors at the district level, accounting for the
small number of clusters using the bootstrapping method proposed by Cameron et al [31]. In all
models, we included facility ﬁxed effects (γj)to control for facility-level unobserved time invariant
characteristics and year ﬁxed effects (δt) a dummy variable taking the value of 0 at baseline and 1
at endline. We also control for individual-level characteristics (education, religion, marital status,
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occupation, age, number of pregnancies) and household characteristics (insurance status, num-
ber of household members, household head education, and wealth based on ownership of house-
hold assets and housing particulars) that are known to affect the outcomes (Xijt). The effect of
P4P on outcomes is estimated as β1. To assess whether P4P has differential effects by socio-eco-
nomic status, we ran extended models, by interacting the P4P variable with the time dummy and
the household wealth terciles. The ability of the difference-in-difference approach to accurately
identify the causal effect of P4P, relies on the assumption that trends in outcomes between inter-
vention and comparison sites were running parallel prior to the start of the intervention, or that
the comparison site represents a valid counterfactual, or measure of what would have happened
in intervention facilities without the intervention. While this assumption can never be formally
tested, we veriﬁed that trends in a number of outcomes were similar between the intervention
and comparison areas prior to the introduction of P4P (S1 File). The analysis of facility register
data is restricted to facilities with 30 months or more data (S2 File). All statistical analyses were
done with STATA (version 12).
Ethics
The evaluation study received ethical approval from the Ifakara Health Institute institutional
review board (approval number: 1BI1IRB/38) and the ethics committee of the London School
of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. Study participants provided written consent to participate in
this study, requiring them to sign a written consent form that was read out to them by the
interviewers. This consent form was reviewed and approved by the ethics committees prior to
the start of the research.
Results
The response rate for each of the surveys varied from 92% to 100%, with the lowest rate being
in the household survey in the intervention area at baseline (Fig 1). The characteristics of
women, patients and facilities across intervention and comparison sites were generally similar
(S3 File). Women from intervention areas were more likely to be Muslim, married, and poor
than their counterparts in comparison areas (Tables C and D in S3 File). They were less likely
to do farming and have secondary education. These differences are not a problem for the differ-
ence-in-difference analysis which controls for any baseline differences between groups. The
key assumption that trends in a number of key outcomes prior to the introduction of P4P were
statistically similar between intervention and comparison groups was confirmed (S1 File).
Almost all of the intervention facilities sampled (96%) had received some bonus payments
during the 13 month evaluation period. The funds that were retained at the facility level were
generally used to purchase drugs and supplies. Table 2 reports our estimates of the impact of
P4P on service use. We found a significant increase in two of the eight targeted indicators: a
10.3% increase (95% CI: 4.4% to 16.1%) in the share of women receiving two doses of IPT dur-
ing ANC; an 8.2% increase (95% CI: 3.6% to 12.8%) in the share of women having an institu-
tional delivery. There was a positive effect on polio immunization at birth, with coverage
increasing by 5.6% (95% CI: -1.0% to 12.2%), but this was not significant at p<0.05 level. There
was a greater increase in institutional deliveries among the middle tercile relative to the least
poor tercile, and among the poorest tercile relative to the least poor tercile for deliveries in pub-
lic facilities; but the effect was only significant at the p<0.1 level (S2 Table). When standard
errors were clustered at the district level, the effect on institutional deliveries was only signifi-
cant a p<0.1 level and there were no differential effects by socio-economic group (Tables A
and E in S4 File).
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For services closely related to the targets, there were positive effects on overall coverage for
ANC increasing by 3.3% (95% CI: 1.5% to 5.1%), however, there was no evidence of an effect
on the proportion of women having four or more ANC visits, or postnatal care in the previous
two months (Table 2). These results were consistent when standard errors were clustered at the
district level (Table A in S4 File) and in the nonlinear model (Table A in S5 File).
There was no effect on the use of non-targeted services proxied by total outpatients visits for
those under and over five years of age when considering all facilities (the effect on outpatient
visits for those aged under five years was significant when clustering at the district level
(Table B in S4 File)). However, the use of these services decreased significantly in lower level
facilities (in dispensaries) by 57.5 visits per month for children under five years of age (a reduc-
tion of 35% compared to baseline levels) (95% CI: -110.2 to -4.9). The decrease was by 90.8 vis-
its per month (a reduction of 33% compared to baseline levels of utilisation) for those aged
over five (95% CI: -156.5 to -25.2) (Table 3). The results were consistent when standard errors
were clustered at the district level (Table B in S4 File).
There was no effect of P4P on measures of patient experience of care for targeted services.
There was an increase in provider kindness reported by patients during delivery, a positive 0.38
point increase in the mean kindness score (95% CI: -0.06 to 0.80), although this was not signifi-
cant at p<0.05 level (Table 4). There was an increase in patient satisfaction with inter-personal
care for non-targeted services with a 0.05 increase in the mean score (7.2% increase relative to
baseline) (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.10). There was no differential effect on quality of care indicators by
socio-economic group. The results were consistent when standard errors were clustered at the
district level (Table C in S4 File).
P4P resulted in a greater enforcement of exemptions for delivery care at public facilities (a
5.0% reduction in those paying out of pocket (95% CI: -9.3% to -0.7%) (Table 5). The effect
was consistent when standard errors were clustered at the district level (Table D in S4 File) and
in the nonlinear model (Table B in S5 File). However, there was no effect on exemptions for
Table 2. Direct and indirect effect of P4P on the use of targeted services.
Baseline survey Difference in difference, effect
Outcome Variables Intervention Comparison Difference P-value N Beta† (95% CI) P-Value %D*
Targeted services
At least 2 doses of IPT during ANC (%) 495 567 -72 0005 4759 10.3 [4.4 to 16.1] 0001 208
HIV treatment during ANC (%) 78 68 10 0527 5666 -03 [-4.2 to 3.7] 0893 -38
Institutional delivery rate (%) 847 868 -21 0350 5747 8.2 [3.6 to 12.8] 0001 97
Institutional delivery rate (%)(public) 768 778 -10 0786 5747 6.5 [1.3 to 11.7] 0015 85
Polio vaccine at birth (%) 774 785 -11 0668 5747 5.6 [-1.0 to 12.2] 0093 72
Measles (%) 514 533 -19 0654 1252 9.6 [-2.5 to 21.6] 0119 18.7
Penta 3 doses^ (%) 764 799 -35 0243 2574 2.4 [-6.6 to 11.4] 0597 31
Postnatal care in facility<7 days (%) 215 169 46 0043 5745 06 [-5.0 to 6.3] 0823 28
Use of any family planning (%) 367 392 -25 0398 5514 -07[-7.4 to 6.0] 0844 -1.9
Non-targeted aspects of targeted services
Any ANC visit(%) 972 999 -27 0001 5742 3.3 [1.5 to 5.1] 0000 34
Four or more ANC visits (%) 650 712 -62 0020 5674 3.9 [-2.7to 10.4] 0245 60
Postnatal care in facility < 2 months (%) 277 234 43 0120 5745 -1.6 [-8.1 to 4.9] 0625 -58
*The % D = (beta / baseline mean) × 100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention group.
†The Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy, facility-ﬁxed effects, individual-level and household characteristics.
^Among infants aged 6–11 months.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.t002
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ANC or PNC, nor on the average amount paid or on the provision of gifts by patients for these
services in the linear model. A negative effect was identified on the likelihood of paying out of
pocket for antenatal care, and a positive effect on giving a gift in the non-linear model but this
was only significant at p<0.1 level (Table B in S5 File). There was a greater reduction in the
probability of paying for deliveries among the poorest tercile relative to the least poor tercile
(S2 Table), but the effect was only significant at p<0.1 level, and the effect was not present
when standard errors were clustered at the district level and in the non-linear model (S4 and
S5 Files). There were no other differential effects on cost indicators by socio-economic group.
Discussion
We report on the effect of P4P in relation to a broad set of outcomes—by considering effects
on non-targeted as well as targeted services, service quality, user costs and equity. The evalua-
tion of the P4P scheme in Tanzania revealed mixed findings in relation to service coverage.
There were significant positive effects for two out of eight performance indicators: coverage of
institutional deliveries and provision of two doses of anti-malarials during pregnancy. While
no overall effect on the use of non-targeted services was found, there was a reduction in the use
of non-targeted services at dispensaries which represent the majority of facilities in the region.
With regards to quality, there was no improvement in antenatal content of care and there was
no effect on patient satisfaction with inter-personal care for targeted services, but there was a
significant improvement in patient satisfaction with inter-personal care for non-targeted ser-
vices. With regards to user costs, P4P led to greater enforcement of exemptions at public facili-
ties for one out of the three targeted services considered (deliveries). However, we found no
improvement in financial protection as measured by the amount paid by the patient for each
service. Finally, there is an indication that the effects on the rate of institutional deliveries in
public facilities may have been pro-poor. No other equity effects were identified.
The closest antecedents to our study are the evaluations of P4P in Rwanda and in Burundi.
In Rwanda, the scheme led to improvements in four out of 14 targeted services [12]. Only two
of the targets were the same in both countries: deliveries, where effects were of a similar magni-
tude despite higher baseline coverage in Tanzania [12] and IPT during ANC, where no effect
was documented in Rwanda. In contrast to the current study, which showed the effect of the
Table 3. Effect of P4P on the use of non-targeted services.
Baseline survey Difference in difference, effect
Outcome Variables Intervention Comparison Difference P-
value
Facilities N Beta† [95% CI] P-Value %D*
Outpatient visits per month > 5 yrs 3595 2873 722 <0001 96 3353 -158 [-1011 to
695]
0714 -44%
Outpatient visits per month > 5 yrs,
dispensaries
2768 2354 414 0006 69 2538 -908 [-1565 to
-252]
0007 -328%
Outpatient visits per month < 5 yrs 2239 1937 302 0011 93 3247 -411 [-932 to
109]
0120 -184%
Outpatient visits per month < 5 yrs,
dispensaries
1648 1726 -78 0441 72 2428 -575 [-1102 to
-49]
0033 -349%
Note to Table: N = facility months;
*The % D = (beta / baseline mean) × 100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention group.
†The Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility-ﬁxed effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.t003
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Table 4. Effect of P4P on quality of care.
Baseline survey Difference-in-difference, effect
Outcome Variables Interventionmean
[sd]
Comparisonmean
[sd]
Difference P-
value
N Beta† [95%
CI]
P-Value %D*
Targeted services
ANC content of care index 053 [019] 049 [017] 004 0103 680 -006 [-013
to 002]
0118 -113
Index of patient satisfaction with
interpersonal care for outpatient
services
072 [016] 070 [017] 002 0426 1247 004 [-001
to 009]
0138 56
Index of patient satisfaction with
interpersonal care during deliveries^
063 [019] 064 [018] -001 0411 4941 001 [-002
to 004]
0505 16
Patient assessment of staff kindness
during delivery score (1–10)^
72 [27] 76 [27] -04 0009 4920 038 [-006
to 082]
0088 53
Waiting time in minutes 509 [568] 488 [612] 21 0793 1211 55 [-174 to
284]
0636 108
Consultation time in minutes 158 [125] 136 [103] 22 0117 1211 -08 [-44 to
28]
0650 -51
Non-targeted services
Index of patient satisfaction with
interpersonal care
069 [018] 074 [015] -005 0007 1170 005 [001 to
010]
0030 72
Waiting time in minutes 514[574] 437 [456] 77 0213 1126 -103 [-297
to 89]
0292 -20.0
Consultation time in minutes 139 [115] 137 [122] 02 0899 1130 -03 [-33 to
27]
0868 -22
Note to Table: Same sizes as indicated at top except where indicated ^.
^ Data from household survey: sample size;
*The % D = (beta / baseline mean) × 100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention group.
†The Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy, facility-ﬁxed effects, individual-level and household characteristics
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.t004
Table 5. Effect of P4P on the cost of services in public facilities.
Baseline survey Difference in difference, effect
Outcome Variables Intervention Comparison Differ-ence P-value N Beta† [95% CI] P-Value %D*
Prob. of paying fpr ANC (%) 8.1 7.5 0.6 0711 5091 -2.7 [-6.0 to 06] 0110 -333
Prob. of paying for delivery care (%) 16.5 11.9 4.6 0026 4485 -5.0 [-9.3 to -07] 0023 -303
Prob. of paying for PNC (%) 60 76 -16 0421 1257 2.1 [-3.7 to 7.9] 0476 350
Amount paid for ANC, mean USD[sd] 023 [15] 015[10] 008 0201 5091 012 [-011 to 035] 0310 522
Amount paid for delivery, mean USD [sd] 180 [87] 218 [165] -038 0509 4485 019 [-117 to 155] 0780 106
Amount paid for PNC, mean USD[sd] 034 [19] 096 [68] -062 0119 1257 043 [-023 to 108] 0202 1265
Provided a gift for ANC (%) 17 12 05 0403 5126 1.2 [-05 to 2.8] 0158 707
Provided a gift for delivery (%) 174 188 -14 0586 4499 -2.8[-8.2 to 2.6] 0302 -167
Provided a gift for PNC (%) 76 45 31 0134 1283 -04 [-6.4 to 5.6] 0897 -66
Value of gift for ANC, mean USD [sd] 005 [05] 003 [03] 002 0177 5126 -004 [-017 to 009] 0569 -800
Value of gift for delivery, mean USD [sd] 061 [21] 059[15] 002 0875 4499 -021 [-046 to 004] 0100 -344
Value of gift for PNC, mean USD [sd] 033 [17] 014 [08] 019 0069 1283 0004 [-032 to 033] 0978 12
*The % D = (beta / baseline mean) × 100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention group.
†The Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy, facility-ﬁxed effects, individual-level and household characteristics
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135013.t005
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P4P package (resources, incentives and performance verification), the Rwanda study isolated
the incentive and verification effects from the resource effect of P4P.
In Burundi, an evaluation of a pilot programme reported a 22% increase in institutional
deliveries and a 10% increase in antenatal care during the first phase of implementation, and
an effect on family planning (during the second phase of implementation) [13]–although only
the effects on a subset of all incentivised indicators were evaluated. The effect of deliveries dis-
appeared when evaluating the national programme, although the effect remained borderline
significant when restricting to those who had been exposed to the intervention for at least a
year [14]. In Burundi, like in our study, the evaluation assessed the resourcing effect of P4P as
well as the incentive effect.
Ours is one of the only studies to report effects of P4P on PNC[9], but there was no evidence
of an effect, possibly because cultural barriers may prevent women from seeking care so early
after delivery [32, 33]. Community based PNC may be a target that is more readily achievable
by providers and acceptable to communities. Other studies have reported P4P effects on family
planning service availability and quality [22]. However, it is also acknowledged that achieving
such effects may take longer and hence, we may have been limited in our ability to detect effects
due to the short time frame of the evaluation [9].
Most studies from low income setting have assessed P4P effects on targeted services with lit-
tle consideration of potential ‘spillover’ effects. The positive effect on the use of a service
(ANC) directly related to a target (two doses of IPT) echoes findings from high income settings
[34, 35]. The fact that no effect was detected for four or more ANC visits suggests that spillover
effects are restricted to services closely related to the target. The evaluation in Burundi also doc-
umented positive effects on components of care provided during ANC which were not directly
incentivized [14]. The significant reduction in outpatient visits at dispensaries in our study is
consistent with concerns on the deterioration of non-targeted services reported elsewhere [35,
36]. The result is also supported by findings from a costing study we conducted which esti-
mated that health workers spent 17% of their time each month on data generation and verifica-
tion activities related to P4P at primary level facilities including dispensaries, reducing
available time to attend to patients [37]. Given these mixed findings, the net effect of P4P on
service utilisation is unclear.
Relatively few studies of P4P in low income settings have reported effects on service quality.
Similar to our study, no effects on patient satisfaction with care were identified in Burundi,
although improved satisfaction and content of care were reported in the Democratic Republic
of Congo [38]. No previous studies have considered provider kindness during deliveries,
although there is growing recognition of the importance of respect and dignity during delivery
[39]. The lack of effect on overall adherence to clinical guidelines or on patient-provider inter-
actions for antenatal care is perfectly plausible, as targets in Tanzania emphasized service cov-
erage rather than quality. The increased patient satisfaction with interpersonal care for non-
targeted services is hard to explain but may be due to the fact that there were relatively fewer
patients attending these services.
The reduction in the probability of paying out of pocket for delivery care in our study is con-
sistent with a study in China [40]. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a 45 percent increase
in overall out of pocket health spending among households was associated with a P4P scheme
that gave freedom to providers to adjust user fees [21]. We were unable to assess the effect of
P4P on the affordability of care, and incidence of catastrophic payments, which are important
dimensions of financial protection [41], this would be an important area for future research.
This study identified a potential pro-poor effect of P4P on deliveries at public health facili-
ties and the probability of paying for delivery care, although these effects were not consistent
across different model specifications. The evaluation in Rwanda found no differential effects by
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socio-economic groups [23]. The Burundi pilot found no differential effect by wealth group
[13], but a pro-poor effect on full immunization coverage was documented in the national eval-
uation, and a pro-rich effect on institutional deliveries [14]. In higher income countries, no
effect of P4P has been found on inequities in age, sex and ethnicity [42, 43].
The data and study design used in this evaluation merit close scrutiny. First, measures of
non-targeted service use in our study relied on patient register data which were incomplete for
many facilities, limiting the available sample for analysis. Reporting of data may also be prone
to ‘gaming’: modifications to the health management information system (HMIS) were intro-
duced alongside P4P in the intervention area and facilities were paid based on the completeness
and timeliness of HMIS reports. Second, conducting credible evaluations of health system
interventions is challenging and in the current study there was no opportunity to randomly
allocate the P4P scheme. By collecting data in comparison districts over time and verifying that
pre-intervention trends were similar, we believe our study represents a rigorous attempt to
identify the effects of P4P. Third, generalising findings from an evaluation of an intervention
as complex as P4P is far from easy and the most promising way forward is likely to be the accu-
mulation of evidence frommultiple settings over time. Our study was large scale and the partic-
ular scheme in Tanzania bears many of the same features as P4P schemes being tested in other
low- and middle- income countries. Our analysis does not adjust results for multiple outcomes,
or the risk when conducting multiple significance tests that some significant results might arise
by chance. We have generated indices where possible to collapse multiple outcomes into a
composite outcome and minimize the number of outcomes (for example for quality of care).
However, in other cases, p-values that are lower than those typically considered ‘significant’
might be given greater weight. Lastly, the evaluation was conducted following 13 months of
implementation. It is hard to know when is the optimal time to measure the effects of pro-
grammes seeking to change behavior such as P4P. Evaluating effects too early may underesti-
mate effects. However, there is also a risk of evaluating effects too late, as a recent study in the
United Kingdom indicated that P4P effects were not sustained over time [44]. There is no real
answer as to the optimum time to evaluate as there is limited evidence on how effects evolve
over time and how long it takes to get an effect. These are important areas for future research.
There has to date been little consideration of the ‘mechanism’ of P4P effect, or how P4P
affects the health system to deliver outcomes [7]. Our starting hypothesis was that utilisation
would increase through improved quality and reduced service costs resulting from changed
provider behaviour. Potential improved kindness during delivery and a better enforcement of
delivery care exemptions are consistent with increased delivery care use. A process evaluation
conducted in parallel with this study also revealed that strategies employed by providers to
meet targets largely centred around the achievement of the delivery care target, for example,
paying traditional birth attendants for referrals, and extending opening hours. In Burundi, it
was reported that effects on deliveries operated through antenatal care, however, this does not
appear to be the case in Tanzania, as the inclusion of the antenatal care variable in our delivery
care outcomes model, did not mediate the effect of P4P on institutional deliveries.
The question begs as to why health workers focused their efforts on delivery care. The
increase in institutional deliveries in Rwanda was hypothosised to be linked to the higher
incentive level attached to this compared to other services [12]. However, in Tanzania there
was no difference in the payments made by service. Achievement of the delivery care target is
rewarded equally to other service targets. Health workers may nevertheless perceive deliveries
to be more profitable, enabling the potential achievement of two targets at once—the delivery
and polio vaccine at birth target. The achievement of the IPT target may have demanded lim-
ited effort as ANC coverage was already very high.
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P4P is being widely implemented across Africa and in many other countries in Asia. While
there is variation in design and implementation across countries [7], the general principle of
financial incentives for targeted services is consistent. Policy makers implementing or planning
to implement P4P should carefully consider the design of P4P schemes to ensure they are com-
patible with universal coverage goals. In order to minimize the risk of reductions in the use of
non-targeted services, for example, implementers might consider regularly rotating service tar-
gets, or incentivizing overall performance across all services. Routine monitoring of effects on
non-targeted services should be encouraged. Ongoing assessment of effects on costs faced by
users and service affordability is also important, and P4P schemes may consider incentivizing
pre-payment and pooling arrangements to enhance compatibility with UHC, or the introduc-
tion of demand side financing strategies such as vouchers, insurance or cash transfers might be
considered alongside P4P [45]. Incentivising quality of care is also clearly important to ensure
effective service delivery that will improve outcomes. However, reliably measuring quality and
integrating routine quality checks into information systems is likely to prove challenging for
many countries [8].
While P4P achieved limited effects on targeted maternal and child health services, overall
progress towards universal coverage was mixed. Further evaluation research on distributional
effects, effects on non-targeted service use and quality, and financial protection is urgently
needed, to determine whether P4P will help achieve progress towards UHC or undermine it.
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